Visiting our troops in Afghanistan

Tobias reports back on a visit to Helmand Province after one of the most harrowing weeks of the campaign.

The first illustration I saw of the dangers our soldiers now face was not in Helmand Province but on arrival at RAF Brize Norton where, outside the poorly lit terminal building, soldiers in desert combats, returning to their units from leave, were saying farewell to family and loved ones. Attempts to hold back the tears were abandoned as little family groups or couples sought comfort and embraced one another, clearly scared of what the future might hold, appreciating every second before the soldiers said their final goodbye.

Following the worst spate of British killings in the campaign and as the death toll of British soldiers in Afghanistan overtakes losses in Iraq, the nation is rightly questioning why we send our soldiers to Afghanistan and if it is doing any good . It is, after all, almost eight years since the initial invasion in the aftermath of 9/11, and there seems little sign that our boys will be coming home soon.

There is a danger of seeing the conflict in Afghanistan through the lens of Helmand. This would be to dismiss the significant advances made in many of the 36 provinces, particularly in the North and East. But Helmand is where the enemy is and where British troops are sent. It is progress here that is measured so earnestly by the British nation.

As a frequent visitor to Afghanistan I have become despondent over the lack of progress made on so many fronts. It was therefore encouraging to see on this visit the sizable changes taking place, such as the arrival of 10,000 US marines in Helmand. The biggest change, however, is tactical; for rather than just patrolling around Forward Operating Bases, both the British and US forces are now on the offensive clearing substantial areas of land in an region called Baniji, used by the Taliban to house opium and bomb factories. It is this necessary change in tactics (code named Operation Panther's Claw) which was needed to break the current stalemate but which also has resulted in the largest number of British sacrifices since the start of the campaign.

There remains a desperate need for heavy lift helicopters and more troops to complete the job. But Britain can be rightly proud of the heroism and valour our troops are displaying in some of the most difficult fighting conditions since the Second World War.

However the Achilles Heel in Afghanistan is the same as in Iraq - namely our inability to properly plan for peace. It is pointless for our boys to secure the top of the hill if life for the local Afghan does not then substantially change in the village below. Without control of their own destiny and unable to provide their own security the Taliban will no doubt return and the sacrifices of our own troops will be in vain.

Sadly I found no evidence of any major reconstruction, development and local governance package to follow behind our armed forces as they complete a most hazardous mission. As long as Whitehall allocates a pathetic £166m for DFID work in Afghanistan compared to the £2.6bn spending on defence in Afghanistan, then defeating the enemy will be possible but enabling locals to take matters into their own hands will continue to be impossible.

We have seen a revolution in the way we conduct warfare from cold war doctrine to counter-insurgency tactics. Whitehall must recognise that until there is a similar overhaul undertaken in how we provide stabilisation and reconstruction support in the insecure environment, we will continue to win battles but lose the peace.

David Loyn in his book 'Butcher and Bolt ; Two Hundred years of Foreign Engagement in Afghanistan ' ends by saying ' One constant theme across two centuries of foreign intervention in Afghanistan has been short -termism ' The British people are being asked to recognise that this present war will not be short , however we will repeat the mistakes of the past where any victory is an illusion if we are not prepared to as Loyn suggests create a thriving agricultural economy, roads, electricity and schools, working with the grain' of the Afghan ' rather than imposing an external model.