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Policy Proposal:
Post Conflict
Reconstruction
Bridging
the gap between military and civilian affairs on the modern battlefield
1.
Wining the war but losing the peace
Our military
engagements are increasingly characterised by rapid defeat of conventional
enemies by relatively small deployments of forces. Whilst this has
been a welcome development -- undoubtedly leading to lower casualties--
it has often exposed the absence of any robust planning for the
post-combat phase. The very forces that have been successful in
combat have been less prepared to address the humanitarian crisis,
lawlessness and destruction of civilian infrastructure which follows
all major combat operations.
Once looting
and petty crime is allowed to take place, the enemy is able to re-group
into an insurgency or new spoilers are allowed to emerge. Both groups
are able to gain support by portraying the intervening force, whether
it is UN mandated or not, as an occupying one. As the CENTCOM commander
General David Petraeus states in the Army/Marine manual on counter-insurgency,
the primary focus of intervention forces should not just be on defeating
the enemy but to enable the local population. In meeting this objective,
the removal of the enemy is only half the task; the other half is
to create a stable environment in which the rule of law can be re-instated
so that the economy can develop.
The current
approach to post-conflict reconstruction places a growing burden
on the intervening troops, delaying their return home. It also leaves
the troop-contributing nations footing a bill considerably larger
than originally expected. Britain's Helmand deployment was originally
calculated to cost only £800 million and now exceeds over
£2bn a year. Such a situation risks undermining public support
not only for the mission at hand - for example NATO's ISAF operation
- but also for future national security missions. A form of "intervention
blues" is now clearly in evidence across Europe, with consequences
for the West's force projection.
Studies have
shown that one of the key failings in post-stabilisation operations
is that nobody is in charge. Newly established national authorities
- like Hamid Karzai's Afghan government for example-lack the necessary
legitimacy, capacity and resources to lead stabilisation work in
the critical window of opportunity which is available once major
combat operations have ended. The United Nations and the European
Union can and do often take on this co-ordinating role, but their
success is limited to low-intensity peace-keeping operations (rather
than peace-making) often preceded by a peace agreement which has
the buy-in of all interested parties. Where threat-levels are higher,
the UN, along with any participating NGOs, tends to depart until
the security situation has improved. Thus, the original intervention
force is left facing a deteriorating security situation whilst little
is done to win over "hearts and minds" by making improvements
to the livelihoods of ordinary people.
A radical overhaul
of the conduct of our stabilisation missions is needed to address
these problems. Britain is often amongst the first of nations to
answer the call for international help or stand up to an enemy well
beyond our shores. Our intentions are honourable but our efforts,
once the fighting has stopped, are often poorly led and lack co-ordination,
making them more inefficient and over-expensive. No doubt work needs
to go into improving international cooperation and reform of NATO
is long overdue, but reforms must first begin at home.
Change is needed
in a number of areas, including the way in which the Cabinet Office
works and the manner in which strategy is developed; how officials
are trained and missions managed, both politically and administratively.
Without a well resourced, promptly executed and realistic plan to
be undertaken by a specialised unit, and one which is capable of
working in a hostile environment, delays in restoring essential
services, establishing a permissive security environment, securing
the rule of law and jump-starting the economy are inevitable. The
creation of a new military 'stabilisation force' which is able to
bridge the transition from war fighting to stabilisation, prevent
the enemy from regrouping and expedite the road to recovery is needed.
Failure to establish
such a capability ultimately means that Britain will always face
the choice between withdrawing troops before peace has been restored
or committing more forces to a complex, costly and prolonged mission,
which will invariably expand, not only to deal with security concerns,
but also to lead the reconstruction effort. This is a job no military
force expects or is currently trained and resourced to undertake.
2. Current UK Capability
At present the
UK has no coherent stabilisation capability. In the absence of any
other agency, DFID is expected to follow behind our troops and lead
the reconstruction and development effort. In reality this was never
within DFID's remit. It was established to tackle poverty, not to
cooperate with the MOD in mopping up after conflicts. Both Afghanistan
and Iraq have proved that DFID does not do danger.
In response
to this lacuna, the Government has created the 'Stabilisation Unit'
(SU) which is jointly run by the Cabinet Office, DFID, the FCO and
the MOD with an annual budget of £269 million . Whilst this
unit is developing some expertise in nation-building, its objective
is to provide specialist assistance in targeted countries emerging
from violent conflict. It therefore advises and does not lead. It
has neither the authority, resources nor manpower to conduct post-conflict
operations in a 'non permissive' (insecure) environment or on the
scale that is now required.
3. Creation of a new Stabilisation and
Reconstruction Force
To include stabilisation
of insecure environments within DFID's remit would be costly and
inefficient. A fresh approach is therefore needed to deal with this
new and dangerous challenge.
To allow the
military to lead a large scale post-conflict tactical force in hostile
environments with a view to immediately initiate the crucial stabilisation
that General Petraeus speaks of would represent a logical step.
The army's logistical chain already likely to be in place admits
any post-conflict situation and troops are already trained for hostile
environments. The HQ of a Stabilisation Force would be comprehensively
involved in the design of the initial battle plans. Specialist knowledge
could be augmented by civilian staff (for example, from other agencies
including the FCO, DFID and even borough councils with expertise
in establishing local governance). All civilians would need to be
TA trained - or provided with compatible training so that personnel
are capable of operating in hostile environments and recognise a
formal chain of command.
4. Objectives
To be effective,
a Stabilisation Force must state a realistic and achievable political
mission. It must include an understanding of what the post-combat
setting should look like when combat operations end. Key areas of
focus would include:
Security
and humanitarian aid
• continued security operations;
local policing; training of local forces;
• assistance with delivery of
emergency humanitarian relief;
• emergency housing and shelter;
food and water;
• basic health facilities;
Economic
Assistance
• restoration of electrical power;
• labour intensive employment
projects;
• repair of basic infrastructure
(roads, key buildings, water and electricity supplies etc.);
• repair or construction of education
facilities;
• assistance with agricultural
projects.
Local Governance
• recognition and support to legitimate
local power base;
• development of grass roots of
local governance.
The extent to which advances will be made in each of these areas
will, of course, depend on a whole host of factors. As soon as the
environment is deemed sufficiently secure, responsibility can be
handed over to a more permanent, civilian-based operation.
5. Size and make up of the force
Taking into
consideration the current size of the UK armed forces and scale
of recent commitments, the creation of a brigade sized unit would
be the minimum required to dovetail into the type of operational
environments we are presently involved in.
The potential
contribution by the TA could be significant. Firstly, to bolster
regular units in the usual way; and secondly, as the vehicle to
train selected groups of civilians with key skills who would need
to become familiar with working in a hostile environment and working
with other military units. For example, developing local governance
could be led by local council civil servants from the UK who have
completed a TA commission and been given additional training, thus
establishing local accountability. Similarly DFID personnel, bankers,
accountants, surveyors, bricklayers, linguists etc. and other specialist
skills that might be required as part of the Stabilisation Force
would all complete a tailored reservist course so they could adapt
to the military environment quicker and protect themselves. Ex-service
personnel constitute a large pool of expertise which could be drawn
upon.
6.
Training local security forces
Effective policing
has been the Achilles' heel in both Iraq and Afghanistan, with local
militias and insurgents taking advantage of the power vacuum. Developing
a local security capability sends a powerful message to all local
communities that the presence of an intervention force is a temporary
one and should be seen as a liberator on a short-term mission rather
than an occupier involved in an open ended commitment.
A Stabilisation
Force could include the teams trained to establish the programmes
which would recruit and train members of the local army, police
and civil service. An expansion of the Royal Military Police (RMP)
as part of a Stabilisation Force could offer a solution. Its current
remit focuses on policing the British military community worldwide
rather than providing assistance and training foreign (possibly
newly established) police forces.
7. Timetable and cost of creating a Stabilisation Force
Creating a stabilisation
capability will take time and should not be achieved by simply moving
existing Army assets into a new order of battle. It should be seen
as part of a new strategy in fighting the type of conflicts we are
likely to encounter in the future. In order to dovetail with current
capabilities and commitments a minimum force of two brigades in
strength would be needed.
The cost of
two new headquarters, two brigades, heavy with Royal Engineer units
as well as the training and holding of an expanded TA is likely
to exceed £ 500m a year (the Capitation Rate or running costs
for a regular infantry brigade is around £100m per year).
However, this figure is put into perspective by the cost of involvement
in Iraq which has averaged £1.5bn a year since 2003 and £1.42bn
for Afghanistan since 2006 (and climbing).
With the existing
defence budget already under pressure we must look elsewhere to
fund this new force. And if its remit is largely humanitarian, it
is only logical to turn towards DFID which would lose current responsibility
for post- conflict operations if a stabilisation force were established.
Re-directing
part of DFID's £7bn across to the MOD would therefore pay
for a force to be created and maintained. Aside from more efficient
spending of the humanitarian budget it would mean high intensity
military operations are likely to be concluded months or years sooner
than under the current system. These savings are would be huge considering
the cost of these operations to the taxpayer.
8. Conclusion
The urgency
of improving our stabilisation and reconstruction capability cannot
be over-estimated. Reform of our stabilisation skills has yet to
take place because Government departments continue to pursue separate
agendas and territorial battles over funding. The consequences have
been inefficiencies and delays in supporting our Armed Forces in
their efforts to provide a secure enough environment for stabilisation
work to begin.
In reality,
we cannot predict where in the world assistance will be required.
What we can say for certain is that we live in an increasingly volatile
world. Whether it be to due to natural disaster or man made ruin,
we urgently need a modern, co-ordinated, efficient and, dynamic
post war fighting capability which is able to meet the nation building
challenges that our world demands.
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